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The main thrust of this argument, which Sapontzis
calls the "Predation Reductio," is that an
obligation to prevent or alleviate animal suffering
would entail an obligation to prevent or alleviate
natural predation. But this would be absurd, and
so we must conclude that we do not have a moral
obligation to prevent or alleviate unjustified
animal suffering. Sapontzis is willing to concede
that an obligation to prevent natural predation
does follow from his account of our moral
obligations to animals (at least when doing so
would not cause as much or more suffering than
it would alleviate) but seeks to block the reductio
by denying that such an obligation would be
absurd. Before I look at Sapontzis' defense of this
claim, let us consider whether this kind of
obligation can be made out on any other account
of our obligations to animals.
It seems clear that such an obligation can be
made out along utilitarian lines. Obviously,
animals are capable of suffering. The strength of
an argument like Peter Singer's3 stems from the
fact that it acknowledges this fact, and so
concludes that the pain and suffering of animals
must be taken into account when calculating the
over-all utility of some deed. But it is equally
obvious that being pursued, attacked, and eaten
can cause pain and suffering in the animal
pursued. So, from the utilitarian point of view, the
only real question is whether or not we can
alleviate any of this pain and suffering without in
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In recent years there has been a small but
growing number of philosophers who wish to
claim that some non-sentient, non-living things
have direct moral standing. 1 They wish to claim,
that is, that we have a moral obligation to the
natural environment that cannot be reduced to or
explained solely in terms of any obligations we
might have to other human beings, other sentient
beings, or even other living beings. I would like
to add my name to this list. In this paper I will
examine some of the reasons for adopting what
appears to be such a counter-intuitive position. I
will begin by considering a recent argument by
Steve Sapontzis to the effect that we may have a
moral obligation to prevent natural predation.
In Morals, Reason, and Animals/ Sapontzis
considers the following argument:
Al: Suppose that humans were morally
obligated to alleviate avoidable, unjustified
animal suffering.
A2: lnnocent animals suffer when they are
preyed upon by other animals.
A3: It would follow that humans are morally
obligated to prevent predation.
A4: But an obligation to prevent predation
would be absurd.
AS:
Therefore, contrary to hypothesis,
humans are not morally obligated to alleviate
avoidable, unjustified animal suffering.
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are simply like "children" in this regard, in that
they do not appreciate the moral significance of
their behavior. So, even if we cannot condemn
natural predators, we can still claim that there is
something at least morally regrettable in natural
predation.
While there is much that is of interest in
Sapontzis' discussion, what I want to foeus on is
his claim that an obligation to prevent predation
would not be absurd. Sapontzis considers several
varieties of absurdity and concludes that an
obligation to prevent predation is not absurd on
any of them. The claim that we ought to prevent
some predation is not inconsistent with any of the
basic principles of reasoning, nor with any
observed fact, and so the obligation is neither
logically nor factually absurd. Furthermore, it is
not "contextually" absurd, in that it does not
violate the context or "spirit" of any of the
premises that entail it. (At least not if we add the
proviso that we are obligated to prevent predation
only if we can do so without causing as much or
more pain and suffering than we would be
alleviating.y Finally, Sapontzis argues that such an
obligation would not be "theoretically absurd." To
be theoretically absurd, a claim would need to be
''inconsistent with some well-supported, thoroughly
accepted theory, the principles of which seem
much less questionable than the hypothesis from
which the offending conclusion derives." 8 Sapontzis
considers a number of different ethical theories
and concludes, with one exception, that for none
of them would this obligation be absurd.
The one exception that Sapontzis allows is
precisely the kind of ethical theory that I am
interested in here. An obligation to prevent
predation would be absurd if one adopted the
kind of ethical theory attributed to Aldo Leopold
viz., that "a thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the
biotic community, [and] wrong when it tends
otherwise."9 Assuming that natural predation
"tends to preserve the integrity, stability and
beauty of the biotic community," preventing it
would thus be inconsistent with the tenets of such
a theory. But this fact need not bother us,
according to Sapontzis, as this principle is not as
"well supported" or "thoroughly acceptable" as are
the premises that entail the obligation to prevent
predation. "Indeed," Sapontzis continues, "that

the process causing even more. I will just assume
that this is so. This does not imply that we could
achieve a lessening of over-all suffering in every
case, but only that were we to intervene in
thoughtful ways, we could alleviate some over-all
pain and suffering. But even if we could not
effectively lessen the total amount- of pain and
suffering by intervening in any specific case, we
would still be obligated to do so if we could.
Thus, it seems clear that an obligation to prevent
at least some natural predation can be made out
on utilitarian lines.
A similar obligation can be derived from the
sort of non-utilitarian position that Tom Regan
advances in "The Case for Animal Rights."•
Suppose we posit some kind of "inherent value" in
all conscious things--i.e., in everything that is "the
experiencing subject of a life." 5 If there is an
inherent value in all conscious life, then the taking
of such a life would seem to be inherently wrong,
regardless of who or what takes the life. One
might object that even if conscious life is
inherently valuable, there remain circumstances
where taking a life is morally justifiable, and the
taking of conscious life involved in natural
predation is one of these circumstances. But the
scope of this objection is limited. If killing for
food is morally justifiable for natural predators,
the same should be true for human predators,
whether they are individual hunters or corporate
factory farmers. By the same token, if predation
by humans involves a moral wrong, then so does
predation by animals, and so the objection is
irrelevant to any account that denies that humans
ate morally justified in killing animals for food.
Consequently, an obligation to prevent natural
predation can be derived from at least some non
utilitarian ethical theories.
None of this would imply, of course, that we
must hold animal predators morally responsible
for taking the lives of other animals. As Sapontzis
correctly points out, we can separate our moral
judgement of an act from our moral judgement of
the actor. Consider our judgements concerning
children and the criminally insane. While we do
not hold these individuals morally culpable for
their behavior, we can still characterize their
behavior (tormenting cats, for example) as morally
wrong.6 Consequently, we can take the same
attitude with respect to animal predators. They
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environmental principle is so contrary to paradigm
ethical principles ... that it is much more likely to
be the object of a theoretical reductio than the
basis for one." 10
It is at this point that I must object. I think that
Sapontzis has put his finger on exactly the right
issue but has the reasoning just backwards.
Clearly, both of the principles in question are
counter-intuitive. I will grant that "the
environmental principle," as Sapontzis calls it, is
initially hard to swallow, but the same must be
said of the purported obligation to prevent
predation. Indeed, Sapontzis at least implicitly
accepts this when he recognizes the need to
defend this obligation against the charge of
absurdity. Given the incompatibility of the two
principles, the question for us now is which to
accept and which to reject.
I claim that an obligation to prevent natural
predation is morally absurd. By claiming that it is
morally absurd, I mean to say that it is
inconsistent with a deep-seated moral conviction
-viz., that the human species is but one part of a
self-sustaining, vastly complex and interconnected
system of living and non-living things, and that
the total value of this integrated whole cannot be
dependent upon any single part of it. If the
existence of the natural environment is not
dependent upon us, neither is its value: if it does
not exist because of us, neither does it exist
merely for us. If we adopt an ecological and
evolutionary account of the world in which we
live, then humanity is not the "end" of creation
but merely one part of an interdependent
ecosystem that existed before us and will
presumably (and hopefully!) exist after us. If we
view that interconnected and interdependent
system as a kind of "machine," then we are but
"cogs" in that "machine" and not the "owners" or
"operators" who can "use it" for whatever
purposes or ends we see fit.
It strikes me that there is a kind of arrogance
in the idea that we even might have an obligation
to prevent natural predation. It is as if we were
saying that the animal kingdom is inherently
immoral, since it is based upon practices that are
morally wrong, and that it is up to us to right
these wrongs. I am reminded of western
missionaries who feel it is incumbent upon them
to "save the souls" of aboriginal peoples. The
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attitude is the same in both cases; viz., that the
"primitive'' practices of these "heathens" or "dumb
brutes" is morally unacceptable, and so it is up to
us, who are "enlightened" and "know-better," to
set them straight. The paternalistic attitude is the
same and the arrogance is the same. Furthermore,
this same attitude must actually apply to the
environment as a whole. After all, the entire
ecosystem is based upon this "balance of nature"
where living things compete with one another for
limited resources and where, with the exception of
plant life, to be a living thing entails consuming
other living things. Animal predation is just one
instance of this larger pattern, and so it must be
that there is something morally improper about
the very fabric of the natural environment. It
strikes me that this view of things is not only
morally absurd, it is morally repugnant.
These are strong words. I am not, however,
attributing this kind of arrogance to Sapontzis or
to any others who advance a moral theory that
can be shown to entail this kind of obligation.
Rather, I am trying to make clear why I think
there is something fundamentally wrong with any
moral theory that entails such an obligation.
Obviously, there is a substantial disagreement
here. Let us see if we can uncover its source.
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total holism. The common moral goal of
reducing the suffering in life and otherwise
making life more enjoyable and fulfilling
wonld not obviously be more effectively
pursued by valuing individuals only as
contributors to a community. Indeed, since
it is individuals, not communities, that
experience enjoyment, fulfillment, distress,
and frustration, ... it seems reasonable to
conclude that total holism would not
provide as likely a path to this moral goal
as our current ...morality.... 16

In the last chapter of Morals, Reason, and
Animals, Sapontzis examines the kind of
environmental ethic considered above and finds it
wanting--indeed, he has real doubts about whether
it can be classified as a moral philosophy at all.11
Since Sapontzis finds this environmental ethic to
be so obviously less acceptable than an obligation
to prevent predation, it will be helpful to look at
Sapontzis' criticism of it.
One of the two views that Sapontzis criticizes,
and the one I will focus on here, is the position
advanced by J. Baird Callicott. 12 Callicott openly
accepts the sort of environmental ethics suggested
by Leopold. That is, he accepts "the extension of
direct ethical considerability from people to
nonhuman natural entities." 13 The "land ethic," as
Callicott calls it,
·

These (and othet7 ) remarks suggest that
Sapontzis has not fully grasped the radical nature
of the change in our attitudes that is being
proposed. Sapontzis argues that "there is no moral .
reason for adopting total holism" and that it is
doubtful that there is any way to defend the
claim that nonsentient natural entities can have a
kind of value apart from their value as
instruments for sentient beings. But as I see it,
what is being proposed is a wholly new way of
looking at what constitutes a "moral reason." What
is being suggested is a reassessment of the moral
goals or values on the basis of which various
moral claims can be logically defended. Thus, it
seems that Sapontzis is criticizing the
environmentalist position because it cannot be
shown to follow from the existing "moral reasons"
or "moral goals," when what is being proposed is
a change in those very moral reasons and goals.
The land ethic, once again, claims that there is
some kind of non-instrumental moral value in the
environment as a whole, and that, consequently,
we must grant direct moral status even to
nonsentient parts of that environment. It is
tempting--but, I believe, mistaken--to view this as
the suggestion that we must "widen" the domain
of things that have moral standing. This
"broadening" of the moral sphere could then be
understood as analogous to the kind of
broadening proposed by those who would have us
extend moral standing to all sentient creatures.
Thus, it is tempting to see the environmentalist
position as the latest in a series of proposed
expansions of the moral realm, parallel to the
"expansions" that recognized the moral standing of
women and non-whites.
But this would be a mistake. The proposal is

is holistic in the sense that the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic
community is its summum bonum....
Modern ethical theory has consistently
located moral value in individuals, ... while
environmental ethics locates ultimate value
in the ''biotic community" and assigns
differential moral value to the constitutive
individuals relatively to this standard. 14
Thus the position that Callicott is advancing
suggests a kind of "ethical holism" that finds
intrinsic moral value in the biotic community as
a whole, and assigns moral value to individuals
only derivatively, given their place in this
community.
But Sapontzis is not moved. Land "ethicists,"
Sapontzis argues,
want to deny that nonsentient entities have
value only as instruments for sentient
beings and to affirm that such entities have
goods or interests of their own that we
ought (morally) to respect. It is doubtful
that this affirmation can (logically) be
defended. ' 5
And to the ethical holism described above,
Sapontzis responds:
... [T]here is no moral reason for adopting
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direct moral standing to the natural environment
as a whole stems from a belief in the
metaphysical independence and reality of the
natural world. If one takes seriously the idea that
the planet we live on has existed for billions of
years prior to the existence of any human being,
and that human beings themselves have evolved
as one part of a vastly complex, interconnected,
and interdependent ecosystem, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that human beings are not
the center of the universe--that man is not the
measure of all things.
But what follow.s from this insight? One thing
that follows is that we should be able to apply to
human behavior the same sorts of "naturalistic"
explanations that we apply to animal behavior. If
one looks at the behavior of animals in an
ecologically sensitive way, one tends to see that
behavior in terms of its purpose or function in the
wider ecological economy. Thus predators often
attack only the weak or the sick, thereby
contributing to the over-all strength and health of
the population preyed upon. And this, in tum, will
insure that in the future, only the strongest and
healthiest predators will be able to hunt
successfully. Of course, the individual predator has
none of this "in mind." Presumably, they attack
the weak and sick because this is easier, or simply
because it is only the weak or the sick they can
catch. Consequently, we can see ecological
purpose or function even when this is hidden
from the animal itself. Likewise, the "protective
instinct" evidenced by mammals towards their
immature offspring has direct evolutionary value,
given that mammals are typically born without the
skills or defenses necessary to support or protect
themselves. But once again, the mammalian
mother knows nothing of this evolutionary design,
although she presumably (and apparently) feels
some direct bond with her young, or simply
defends them instinctually. Again, we see the
evolutionary value, even if the animal does not. In
each case, it seems, what has evolutionary or
ecological value is whatever it is in the animal
that causes or motivates it to act in these ways.
My suggestion is that these same kinds of
explanations can be applied to human behavior,
and, more specifically, to human values. Thus, the
things we find pleasurable (e.g., eating, sex,
companionship) can be explained in terms of their

not that we bring more individuals into the "fold"
but that we reject the idea that individuals are the
sorts of things that have intrinsic moral worth.
The claim is not that trees and rivers have the
same sort of intrinsic moral standing as do human
beings, or other sentient beings, but that trees,
rivers, human beings and animals alike have a
moral standing derived from the value of the
environment as a whole. While it is clear from his
characterization of ethical "holism" that Sapontzis
understands that this is what Callicott and others
are proposing, the kinds of criticisms he makes of
this proposal suggest that he has not fully grasped
what this entails. If what counts as having moral
standing is to be changed, this will entail a change
in what will count as the "goals" of morality and
what will count as a moral reason. If the
foundations or "beginnings" of morality are to be
altered, so must be its "ends." Thus, it is a
mistake to criticize ethical holism on the grounds
that it is not an effective means of achieving the
"moral goal of reducing suffering and otherwise
making life more enjoyable and fulfilling ...." If we
accept ethical holism, then this goal is no longer
an ultimate goal of morality but must be
understood m terms of its value to the
environment as a whole. To criticize the
environmentalist position on these grounds is to
criticize it for failing to meet up to a set standard
that it explicitly rejects. It is not surprising, then,
that one would find "no moral reason for adopting
total holism" if what one counts as a moral reason
is deeply embedded in a moral theory that is
fundamentally opposed to this kind of holism.
What
is
being
proposed
by
the
environmentalists, then, is something akin to a
"paradigm shift" in moral philosophy. We must
therefore recognize, as with any proposed shift in
theoretical paradigms, that from the standpoint of
the "established" paradigm, the claims of the "new"
paradigm will seem ridiculous or, worse yet, to
be concerned with some other topic altogether.
(Recall Sapontzis' doubts about "whether
environmental holism is itself a moral philosophy
at all.") But of course, to note the radical nature
of the change being proposed is not to defend the
need for such a change. For the remainder of this
paper, I will address some of the reasons for
accepting this change in ethical paradigms.
As I see it, the primary impetus for granting
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evolutionary value. Likewise with the things that
cause us pain. Callicott thus ridicules as
"biologically preposterous" the utilitarian doctrine
that "life is the happier the freer it is from pain
and that the happiest life conceivable is one in
which there is continuous pleasure uninterrupted
by pain .... "18 To view pain as intrinsically evil is to
lose sight of the fact that it conveys "important
organic information."'9 But while there is
something to Callicott's criticism, it seems that he,
too, has missed the point. Callicott is correct in
calling attention to the evolutionary value of the
experience of pain. But what he apparently fails
to grasp is that what has evolutionary value is not
pain or pleasure itself but the fact that individual
humans and other sentient creatures value
pleasure and seek to avoid pain. What is
important is what we do in order to maximize
pleasure and minimize pain. Consequently, it is
the fact that we have the individual and social
values that we do that serves an evolutionary or
ecological function by motivating us to behave in
certain ways. In short, we can give evolutionary
or ecological explanations for why we have the
moral values that we do. But if we take these
evolutionary explanations seriously, we must
accept that the moral paradigm with which we
have been operating has its basis or foundation in
a "deeper" system of values.
Thus, one reason for changing ethical paradigms
is that if we take these evolutionary and
ecological explanations seriously--as I think we
should--we can see the role or function of our
existing moral values in a larger context. We can
see that they serve a larger purpose, and that,
consequently, their value is not intrinsic but
derives from their "place" in this larger context.
But the only way I know of to account for this
"deeper" set of intrinsic values is to posit direct
moral standing in the natural environment itself.
One may question, at this point, the
appropriateness of- calling this "deeper" value a
moral value at all. That is, one may doubt, as
does Sapontzis, whether this kind of ethical holism
really merits being called a moral philosophy at
all. After all, as Sapontzis claims, "[s]ignificant
moral criticism must (logically) be based, at least
in part, on our currently accepted moral principles
or values.'"0 But is there anything in what I am
suggesting that is in the least bit similar to our
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"currently accepted moral principles or values?"
I think that there is. One has to be careful, of
course, in placing too much emphasis on current
moral values, or one will end up arguing that
moral criticism is impossible a priori. Clearly, the
claim that we have significant moral obligations to
animals stands opposed to our current moral
principles, if the latter are defined narrowly
enough. With respect to any moral criticism, we
must be able to appeal to some kind of
fundamental moral principles on which we can
base our criticism, if we wish to claim that they
are indeed moral criticisms. What fundamental
principles or insights can the environmentalist
appeal to that will be recognized as moral
principles and moral insights?
Let me suggest one. I think my sense that there
is something arrogant in the claim that we have
a moral obligation to prevent natural predation is
based upon a fundamental moral sentiment that it
is improper to place too much emphasis or
importance upon oneself, especially if the facts do
not bear out this evaluation. It strikes me that
there is something morally perverse in believing
that we are in any position to make moral
judgements concerning the very fabric of the
world that has given us existence. It is a sign of
hubris to think that the natural environment is
simply ours to do with as we like, and that it has
value only because of us, even though we have
existence only because of it. Given our relatively
small place in the grand scheme of things, it is
unacceptably anthropocentric to think that the
nonsentient parts of the environment have value
only because we bestow it upon them.
But Sapontzis will argue that his "animal
liberationist': ethic can account for the natural
environment having a value over and above its
usefulness to human beings. In addition to its
value for human beings, we must, according to
Sapontzis, recognize its value for other sentient
beings. 21 This would allow us to find value in the
environment that is not directly tied to its
instrumentality to human beings and would thus
apparently avoid the charge of anthropocentrism
leveled above.
This raises a fundamental question. Is the
natural environment to be valued because of its
usefulness to sentient creatures, or because it 1s
the foundation of sentience and of life itself-
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experience when hiking through the woods or
when "face to face" with a massive redwood that
is thousands of years old. But even those who
would not characterize this experience as one of
moral respect often recognize the "psychological
renewal value" 22 of a trip to the country. There is
a common experience, if not a common
understanding, of the value of the natural world,
and we should not underestimate the importance
of this shared experience. I see this value as a
moral value and characterize the experience as
one of reverence and respect for that which is the
basis of all that has value.

because it is the metaphysical ground of aU that
has value? Sapontzis apparently opts for the first
alternative, while I am inclined towards the
second. To answer this question we must ask
ourselves why it is that sentience is so important.
The first alternative apparently finds intrinsic
value in sentience itself and can thus recognize
value in nonsentient things because of their
instrumentality for sentient creatures. But while
this account recognizes that sentient beings are
not of value simply because they are of some~
to human beings, it apparently grants them
independent value because they are ~ to
human beings. The extension of direct moral
standing to all sentient creatures seems to be
based upon the following line of reasoning: we
recognize the intrinsic value of pleasure and of
living a happy and fulfilling life, and also the
intrinsic evil of pain and suffering, and so, to be
consistent, grant direct moral standing to creatures
whose experiences are similar to ours in these
respects. We grant them direct moral standing
because they are like JJ.:i--because they feel what
we feel.
But isn't this also anthropocentric? In this case,
it seems we are assigning moral status to a thing
on the basis of its relation to us. This still places
human beings at the conceptual center of the
moral universe. It allows that there are beings
other than human that have direct moral standing,
but it defines the properties a thing must have in
order to have this standing in terms of a
similarity to human beings. What I wish to
suggest is that we grant moral standing not on the
basis of a thing's relation to us but recognize,
instead, that perhaps we have moral standing
because of our relation to something else. Thm;,,
even the animal liberationist's claim that the value
of the natural environment can be understood in
terms of its usefulness to sentient beings is open
to the charge of moral anthropocentrism.
Is there any other fundamental moral insight the
environmentalist can appeal to in order to buttress
the claim that nonsentient things can have direct
moral standing? In closing, I would suggest we
examine our shared experience of the value of the
natural environment. More than one of the
philosophers mentioned here speaks of a feeling
of moral respect for nonsentient parts of the
environment. This certainly describes my own
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In "Realism and Respect," Professor Baldner
attempts to defend holistic environmental ethics
against criticisms I made of it in my book,
Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1987). While I very
much appreciate the care Professor Baldner has
given to accurately stating and thoughtfully
critiquing my views, I do not find that critique
compelling for the following reasons.
First, the fundamental, theoretical flaw in
environmental ethics of the sort Baldner advocates
is the belief that values can exist without
reference to the capacities of sentient beings. The
prevalence of this mistaken belief among
environmental ethicists may be due to the use of
"value" in phrases like "its value for evolution." In
such phrases "value" refers to the role played by
something in evolution.
This role can be
completely
explicated
m
non-evaluative
descriptions of how this thing interacted with
other things to contribute to the course of
evolution. That this can be done shows that the
term is being used non-evaluatively in such
phrases. Where evaluation enters here is in the
presumption that the course or products of
evolution are good, fulfilling a purpose, or
otherwise worthy. That is a value something has
not merely "for evolution" but for a sentient being
contemplating evolution.
Baldner attempts to support his value theory by
contending that "if the existence of the natural
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